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ROCKS AND ROCKETS: OSLO’S
INEVITABLE CONCLUSION
MOUIN RABBANI
Though the al-Aqsa intifada took the world by surprise, Palestinians
are now almost unanimous in attributing its scope to the failures of
Oslo. The author analyzes these failures from two perspectives: those
concerning implementation and structural flaws. In describing the
unfolding of the intifada and particularly its militarization, the au-
thor analyzes the primordial role of Fatah, the single most important
factor in transforming the early clashes into a sustained rebellion.
IN LATE SEPTEMBER 2000, a general consensus existed that Israel and the Pales-
tinians were on the verge of an agreement—if not before the 6 November
U.S. presidential elections, then certainly by Bill Clinton’s final 20 January
exit from the White House. Israel and the Palestinians had quickly resumed
negotiations following the collapse of the hastily convened Camp David
summit in July, and by September they were meeting in both the United
States and the Middle East. Reports suggesting that the remaining gaps were
being narrowed were reflected by a 25 September dinner hosted by Prime
Minister Ehud Barak at his private Kochav Ya’ir residence in honor of Pales-
tinian Authority (PA) President Yasir Arafat. Four days later, the world was
stunned when Ariel Sharon’s provocative intrusion into the Haram al-Sharif
triggered a Palestinian rebellion that in its first five months would cost as
many lives as did the first intifada in its first year.
WH Y A L -AQ S A  WA S  UN E X P E C T E D
In retrospect, it is the astonishment that greeted the explosion that is the
real cause for surprise. At the time, however, and despite increasing signs of
popular unrest in the year preceding the al-Aqsa intifada, there seemed good
reason to dismiss the possibility of a sustained rebellion with marked similar-
ities to the uprising of 1987–93. Most important, neither leadership wanted a
protracted conflict, which would challenge and potentially destroy the foun-
dations of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation established at Oslo, and in so do-
ing threaten both the PA’s political hegemony and the Barak government’s
stability. Additionally, the political forces considered to have the greatest in-
terest in fomenting an uprising, the Palestinian leftist and Islamist opposi-
tions, had since Oslo been effectively neutralized by the PA, in the first case
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through a process of political marginalization and fragmentation resulting in
its virtual irrelevance, and in the second through a campaign of repression
coordinated with Israel and the CIA reducing them to organizational and mil-
itary paralysis. The mainstream Fatah movement headed by Arafat, which
had played a central role in the previous intifada, was during this period
typically written off as little more than an appendage to the PA.
At the same time, the Palestinian economy, whose development was con-
sidered critical to the success and legitimation of Oslo, was finally beginning
to show signs of life after shrinking by more than a third relative to its al-
ready battered state at the end of the first uprising. While it had by no means
recovered to pre-Oslo levels, it had at least ceased to deteriorate further and,
according to the World Bank and others, was exhibiting encouraging signs
of growth. The general population, after seven years of PA rule governed by
the strictures of Oslo and generally increasing hardship, seemed preoccu-
pied with the struggle for survival, and the generation that came of age after
1993 seemed, to the chagrin of older activists, little different in its priorities,
concerns, activities, and ambitions than youth elsewhere.
More broadly, opinion polls continued to reveal strong, if declining, levels
of support for the continuation of the peace process.1  If the population’s
growing disillusionment reflected genuine anger at Israel’s systematic pre-
varication with respect to signed agreements and the institutionalization of
its blockade of the occupied territories, the continued support for the peace
process suggested both a determination to maintain the degree of normalcy
PA rule had restored to daily life after the violent mayhem of the intifada’s
final years, and the hope that the remaining impediments and larger political
issues perpetuating them could eventually be resolved. Overall, then, the
prospects for mass mobilization seemed remote.
This is not to say that a further round of violence was unanticipated. In-
deed, another confrontation was widely predicted in the wake of the col-
lapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit, but it was expected to serve the
interests of both the PA and Israel—improving a bargaining position here,
establishing the outer limits of flexibility there, and reminding skeptical con-
stituents everywhere of the terrible alternative to an imperfect peace. Israeli
military planning took into account the possibility of a general Palestinian
uprising involving the extensive use of firearms against Israeli soldiers and
settlers. Such scenarios—detailed in the Field of Thorns operational plan
completed in September 1996—were premised upon a short conflict lasting
a few weeks at most, and which, however sharp, would from beginning to
end be closely orchestrated by the PA.2  In other words, a controlled confron-
tation that would not go beyond an extended replay of the Israeli-Palestinian
clashes that engulfed the West Bank and Gaza Strip the same month Field of
Thorns was completed—the so-called tunnel intifada.
The September 1996 clashes, which left approximately eighty Palestinians
and fifteen Israelis dead in the space of one week, had been the most violent
the occupied territories had experienced since 1967. They demonstrated the
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ability of the lightly armed PA security forces to give their Israeli counter-
parts a bloody nose even as the latter resorted to combat helicopters and
tanks and exacted a much higher price from the Palestinians. More important
as far as Israel, the international community, and the PA itself were con-
cerned, the tunnel intifada established the capacity of the Palestinian leader-
ship, when left with no diplomatic alternatives, to marshal the Palestinian
street and, through its security forces, to rapidly take control of popular un-
rest, contain it, and ultimately channel it back into the peace process.3
More recently, the May 2000 Nakba clashes, which featured widespread
demonstrations in support of the Palestinian right of return, were similarly
interpreted as a PA production staged for domestic and international political
considerations.4  Reports that Palestinian gunmen fired at Israeli positions de-
spite strict instructions to the contrary and of an increasingly critical tone
emanating from the Fatah movement failed to impress those Israelis, Pales-
tinians, and others who continued to reduce the sum total of Palestinian
politics to the calculating mind of Yasir Arafat.
Against this background, the development of the September 2000 con-
frontations into a full-fledged Palestinian rebellion against Israeli occupation
took participants and observers alike by surprise. In this respect, 29 Septem-
ber 2000 closely mirrors the beginning of the first intifada on 9 December
1987, when those who had been predicting that Israeli policy was bound to
set off a Palestinian explosion had already been proven correct but did not
yet know it. And with the new intifada, as with the old, there was no
shortage of individuals in positions of power and influence whose refusal to
confront the facts they helped create and rationalize led them to respond to
the ultimately predictable results with disbelief and condemnation, thereby
essentially reducing the origins of the al-Aqsa intifada to an inadmissible re-
sponse to an unacceptable provocation. According to them, neither the
provocation nor the response would have transpired if the letter of Oslo or,
failing this, its “spirit,” had been properly respected . Yet the record of Oslo’s
seven lean years more than suggests that the “spirit of Oslo” would inevita-
bly be revealed in the form of the Grim Reaper.
TH E  RE N E G O T IA T I O N S O F  OS L O
The affront to national and religious sensibilities represented by Ariel
Sharon’s 28 September 2000 entry into Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif was cer-
tainly sufficient cause for mass protest, but even in combination with the
shooting death of seven Palestinians the following day does not account for
the intensity and duration of the al-Aqsa intifada. In similar precedents,
neither the 1990 al-Aqsa massacre in which fourteen people were killed, nor
the 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Muslim worshippers at Hebron’s Ibrahimi
mosque by Baruch Goldstein during the holy month of Ramadan, nor the
September 1996 opening of a tunnel alongside the Haram al-Sharif and onto
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the Via Dolorosa by the Netanyahu government produced a comparable
reaction.
Nor does the fact that Sharon was perceived (correctly) by the Palestinian
leadership as acting in collusion with the Barak government, belligerently
flaunting Israeli control over East Jerusalem at the height of permanent status
negotiations on Jerusalem, add enough fuel to the fire to account for the
ensuing explosion. While Israel has repeatedly  accused the PA of fomenting
the intifada to bolster its diplomatic position, the unprecedented human, ma-
terial, and economic costs borne by the Palestinian population during the
first five months of the uprising—under circumstances in which Palestinian
security agencies, in contrast to the 1996 tunnel intifada, as a rule did not
intervene as an organized force—further suggests that however important
the role of the PA, other factors were also at work.
While the uprising’s immediate context does much to explain its origins,
an appreciation of its scope and objectives must take into account the frame-
work for Israeli-Palestinian relations negotiated at Oslo in 1993. Equally im-
portant is the impact of its subsequent implementation on the lives and
aspirations of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, who in their majority
initially supported the agreement. In this context, the fact that military occu-
pation, settler colonization, and economic underdeve lopment preceded
Oslo is less significant than the reality that, since Oslo, they have been con-
solidated where most expected their removal. Indeed, it was the prospect of
peace, security, freedom, and prosperity, rather than Israeli suppression, that
dealt the final blow to the 1987–93 intifada. And just as the population’s
hopes help explain the end of the previous uprising, so the frustration of
these hopes is central to understanding the current one. In this regard, the
debate between critics who, like Edward Said, have consistently argued that
Oslo was structurally doomed,5  and those who share the Palestinian leader-
ship’s view that the process ran aground because Israel refused to abide by
its commitments, merits closer examination.
The Palestinian claim that Israel refuses to implement signed agreements
and violates its commitments is beyond dispute.6 A simple comparison of
the September 1993 Declaration of Principles (“Oslo”), the September 1995
interim agreement (“Oslo II”), the January 1997 Hebron protocol, the Octo-
ber 1998 Wye memorandum, and the September 1999 Sharm al-Shaykh
agreement7  reveals a clear pattern in which Israel first refuses to implement
its own commitments, then seeks and obtains their dilution in a new agree-
ment, subsequently engages in systematic prevarication, and finally de-
mands additional negotiations, leading to a yet further diluted agreement.
This pattern is most evident with respect to the removal of Israeli military
forces from West Bank and Gaza Strip territory. Whereas Oslo already distin-
guishes between an “Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho
area”8  and the further “redeployment of Israeli military forces in  the West
Bank and Gaza Strip,”9  it nevertheless specifies that “Israel will be guided by
the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated
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areas” and “to specified locations.”1 0 Nowhere does it suggest a distinction
between the character of withdrawal and that of a redeployment. Indeed,
whereas Oslo does permit “[f]urther redeployments to specified locations”
to be “gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of re-
sponsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police
force,”1 1  it states nothing about the fragmentation of the West Bank into ar-
eas designated as “A” (Palestinian security control), “B” (Palestinian civil and
Israeli security control), and “C” (continued Israeli occupation) introduced in
Oslo II. Nor does Oslo stipulate the phasing of the redeployment into three
installments over eighteen months for reasons not specifically related to the
preparedness of the Palestinian police.
Similarly, whereas Oslo II’s redeployment applied to all the occupied ter-
ritories save those areas specifically excluded (“specified military locations,”
East Jerusalem and other West Bank territory annexed by Israel since 1967,
Jewish settlements, and parts of Hebron), the Hebron agreement, which in-
ter alia renegotiated Article VII (“Guidelines for Hebron”) of Oslo II’s Annex
I (“Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements”), re-
versed this principle. Henceforth, even territory not subject to the above
mentioned exemptions from Israeli redeployment would, unless specified
otherwise in additional agreements, remain under full Israeli control. Thus
Israel would redeploy from , rather than to , specific locations.
Wye reinforced this principle and added several innovations of its own.
Pursuant to its terms, an area’s change of status from C to B or B to A (and
thus either from full Israeli or to full Palestinian control rather than from full
Israeli to full Palestinian control) was sufficient to meet the criteria for rede-
ployment. On this basis, the agreement required Israel to transfer only 1 per-
cent of West Bank territory from C to A (an additional 12 percent would
change from C to B, and 14.2 percent from B to A).1 2  Furthermore, the PA
was required to designate fully a quarter (3 percent) of the new B areas as
“Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves,”  an entirely new category in which no
construction was permitted.1 3  Additionally, Wye stretched the implementa-
tion of a single Oslo II redeployment into three stages spread over ten
weeks.1 4  And the scope and implementation of the final, third redeployment
specified by Oslo II was in Wye made subject to agreement by a joint Israeli-
Palestinian committee,1 5  a development that gave Israel the formal right to
revise commitments it had already made.
At the Sharm al-Shaykh negotiations, which dealt with Wye’s unfulfilled
second and third stages of Oslo II’s outstanding second redeployment, Israel
sought to terminate the interim transfer of territory altogether. Instead,
Barak—who as chief of staff had been openly skeptical of Oslo and as a
cabinet member abstained when Oslo II was brought to a vote—hoped to
integrate further redeployments, particularly Oslo II’s third and final one,
into the final status negotiations, thus substantially weakening the PA’s bar-
gaining position. Only partially successful in this attempt, Israel (not for the
first time) resorted to calculating the redeployment percentages on the basis
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of a West Bank from which annexed East Jerusalem, no-man’s-land includ-
ing the Latrun salient, and the portion of the Dead Sea located in the West
Bank had already been subtracted. By not including these areas, which to-
gether total 315 square kilometers,1 6 Israel reduced the area of the West
Bank by some 5.4 percent, thereby reducing the actual size of the areas from
which redeployment would take place. After one such exercise in late 1999,
Israel unilaterally brought the redeployment process to a halt.
Thus, seven years after Oslo was sealed with a handshake on the White
House lawn, three and a half years after Oslo II’s final deadline for the final
redeployment had passed, and more than a year after the entire process was
to have concluded with “a permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338 . . . [which] will lead to the implementation of Se-
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338,”1 7  the PA was in full control of less
than a fifth of the West Bank and scarcely two-thirds of the Gaza Strip.
If its experience of the interim agreements failed to do so, the permanent
status negotiations—begun in earnest only in summer 2000—provided the
Palestinians with unmistakable evidence that, for Israel, Oslo’s recognition of
the legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty over 78 percent of historical Palestine
was but one component of the compromise, and that the remaining 22 per-
cent occupied in 1967 was also on the table. Israel’s determination, with full
U.S. support, to negotiate rather than implement the terms of UNSCR 242—to
“compromise the compromise”—was strenuously denounced by the Pales-
tinians, who considered full recovery of the 1967 territories the irreducible
minimum of their national claims. From the leadership’s perspective, tactical
concessions to keep the interim phase (and thus the prospect of a perma-
nent settlement) alive are one thing, strategic capitulation on final status is-
sues quite another.
TH E  HA R V E S T O F  OS L O ’S  “CO N S T R U C T IV E  AM B IG U I T Y”
In sharp contrast to Oslo’s faithful, its opponents consider that it is the
agreement’s structure that has determined the manner of its implementation.
In other words, an agreement repeatedly violated with impunity is first and
foremost a bad one.
Thus, as Said has consistently argued, Oslo’s fatal flaw is that it is neither
an instrument of decolonization nor a mechanism to implement UN resolu-
tions relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, it is a framework
aimed at changing the basis of Israeli control over the occupied territories in
order to perpetuate it. As such, the process is structurally incapable of pro-
ducing a viable settlement and will ultimately result in further conflict.1 8
In support of their position, Said and other critics argue that the relation-
ship between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forged
in Oslo is demonstratively not based upon a reciprocal recognition of equal
(or even comparable) rights. Whereas the lion’s share of Palestinian conces-
sions historically demanded by Israel was made in the letters of recognition
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immediately preceding Oslo, the relevant agreements never refer to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip as “occupied”; do not explicitly commit Israel to desist
from illegal activities such as settlement building designed to further consoli-
date Israeli rule; and make no attempt either to resolve the core issues that
collectively define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., borders, refugees, Je-
rusalem) or establish unambiguous guidelines for their resolution. Instead,
the latter are shunted aside under the heading “final status issues” and post-
poned for negotiation at the end of the process.
To quote from the record, PLO Chairman Arafat’s August 1993 letter to
Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin explicitly “recognizes the right of the
State of Israel to exist in peace and security” (without specifying borders);
“accepts” UNSCR 242 and 338 (without defining them); “commits” the PLO to
the “peaceful resolution” of the conflict and resolution of “outstanding issues
through negotiations” (without conditions); “renounces the use of terrorism
and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO ele-
ments and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations
and discipline violators” (again without conditions); “affirms that those arti-
cles of the Palestinian Covenant . . . inconsistent with the commitments of
this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid” and promises to “submit
to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary
changes” to the Covenant; and, in both this and a separate letter to Norwe-
gian foreign minister Johan Jorgen Holst, all but explicitly commits the PLO
to terminating the intifada. Rabin’s response, comprising all of one sentence,
commits Israel “in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter . . . to
recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and com-
mence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East process.”19  Full
stop. The contrast between the specificity of the Palestinian letters and Oslo’s
calculated silence on core Palestinian concerns (repackaged by Israeli, Pales-
tinian, and American diplomats as “constructive ambiguity”) could hardly be
greater.
Thus the imbalance of power inherent in Oslo determined its distorted
outcome. Through it, an ascendant Israel seeking to end the tactical burden
of direct military occupation forged a functional partnership with a weak-
ened and exhausted PLO, in which the former would retain possession of
strategic assets in the West Bank and Gaza (land, water, borders, Jerusalem)
and the latter would assume formal responsibility for the indigenous popula-
tion in the framework of a recognized Palestinian entity. It is a process
whose foundation stone is Israel’s own interpretation of its security interests
to which all else, including individual and collective Palestinian rights, is
subordinated.2 0  It is a process that necessarily leads to separation within the
occupied territories under continued Israeli hegemony, as opposed to the
partition of Palestine through a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. In doing so, it formalizes arrangements tanta-
mount to apartheid. (The Dutch/Afrikaans word literally means
“separateness.”)
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Seen from this perspective, the massive acceleration of Israeli settler colo-
nization since 1993, the parallel construction of a road network to connect
the settlements to Israel and each other in a manner that bypasses and encir-
cles Palestinian population centers, the deliberate fragmentation of PA areas
into noncontiguous ethnic enclaves, the strict Israeli control of Palestin-
ian movement into, out of, and between these en-
claves, and the sustained effort to prevent the emer- The massive acceleration of
gence of an independent Palestinian economy Israeli settlement, the
together reflect the true “spirit of Oslo.” Moreover, in fragmentation of PA areas
view of the bilateral character of the agreements into noncontiguous
(whose implementation was never guaranteed by the enclaves, and strict Israeli
international community but rather sponsored by control of Palestinian
Israel’s strategic ally, the United States), it becomes movement together reflect
inevitable that the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian the true “spirit of Oslo.”
relationship would be primarily governed by the
huge imbalance of power between them. Because this dynamic makes it vir-
tually impossible to correct either Oslo’s studied neglect of the requirements
for peace or Israel’s additional distortions of Oslo, it effectively paves the
way to further conflict.
SO W E T O O N T H E  ME D IT E R R A N E A N
The facts on the ground certainly bear the burden of such an interpreta-
tion. Between September 1993 and 2000, the total settler population (exclud-
ing Jerusalem and its environs) increased from 110,000 to 195,000, a
staggering 77 percent. In absolute terms, the annual rate of implantation of
Jewish settlers in illegal West Bank and Gaza Strip colonies averaged 4,200
between 1967 and 1993, 9,600 between 1986 and 1996, and more than
12,000 between 1994 and 2000.2 1  Land expropriations have also continued
apace, amounting to 40,178 dunams (1 dunam = .25 acre) in 1999 alone.2 2  So
insatiable has been Israel’s appetite for Palestinian land since 1993 that few
could fault the observer who concludes that Oslo’s actual achievement was
to broker the end of the Arab occupation of Judea and Samaria.
The relevant statistics also show Barak to have been a considerably more
avid settler than Netanyahu. During Barak’s first year in office, his “peace
cabinet” authorized 1,924 housing starts across the Green Line, as opposed
to 1,160 by Netanyahu’s rejectionist cabinet in 1997. Similarly, Barak permit-
ted construction to resume in eleven of the seventeen unauthorized settle-
ment outposts established immediately after the Wye agreement in response
to Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon’s appeal to “grab every hilltop” but frozen
by the Netanyahu government in 1999.
And in order to integrate these new homes and outposts within Israel,
$198 million in road projects were under construction across the Green Line
in 2000. Because every 100 kilometers of colonial road require 10,000
dunams of land, more than 40 percent of the lands expropriated in 1999
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(16,657 dunams) were dedicated to this purpose, causing the uprooting of
some 15,000 trees.2 3 These roads serve the additional purpose of bolstering
and perpetuating the encirclement of the several dozen isolated Palestinian
enclaves, a reality that has to be seen on a map in order to be properly ap-
preciated.2 4 And with the segmentation of the land, it has become impossi-
ble to drive more than a few kilometers without entering Israeli-controlled
territory and that unique world of military checkpoints manned by soldiers
dedicated to the systematic brutalization and humiliation of anything Arab.
Meanwhile, in the economic sphere, Israel’s continued control of the oc-
cupied territories’ external borders and internal boundaries and its institu-
tionalized, permanent blockade of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had taken a
harsh toll on the population. The marketing of Oslo to the Palestinian public
in 1993 and 1994, instead of denying its political imperfections, had empha-
sized the economic prosperity it would bring. Yet more than seven years
later, more Palestinians were more impoverished than on the eve of the pro-
cess, and the tens of thousands of public sector jobs created by the PA as its
main response to this crisis did little more than prevent a worsening situation
from deteriorating even further. According to the World Bank, Yemen is now
“the only country in the MENA [Middle East/North Africa] region that has a
lower average income than the WBG [West Bank and Gaza Strip].”25  Israel’s
systematic restrictions on labor flows, trade, and movement—well in excess
of anything experienced prior to 1993—ensured that the pipe dream of a
Palestinian “Singapore of the Middle East,” trumpeted so often following the
White House handshake, inexorably gave way to the reality of “Soweto on
the Mediterranean.” Viewed from the ground, the problem of Oslo was not
so much that it failed to match initial expectations, but that, apart from some
meager improvements here and there, things kept getting worse. Only the
PA and the prospect of an acceptable permanent settlement stood between
the growing popular anger and an explosion.
It was against this background that Barak made his Camp David propos-
als, which seemed to offer conclusive proof of the apartheid-cum-bantustan
scenario that Oslo’s critics had been condemning for the better part of a dec-
ade. Although full details have yet to emerge, it is not disputed that Israel in
these negotiations sought, among other objectives, permanently to annex
strategically located Jewish settlement clusters and roads (fragmenting the
proposed Palestinian state into a series of enclaves); maintain ultimate au-
thority over the Gaza-Egyptian and West Bank–Jordanian borders; retain
overall control of a substantially expanded Jerusalem; and achieve formal
and disproportionate water rights.26  In other words, the Palestinian entity—
in arrangements akin to the interwar mandate system established by the
League of Nations—would be reduced to an Arab protectorate under Israeli
domination and supervision. Within these strictures, as Israeli leaders never
tired of pointing out, the Palestinians were free to define their entity as a
state, empire, or any other term to their liking.
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“Has the world been deluded,” asked Said, “or has the rhetoric of ‘peace’
been in essence a gigantic fraud?”2 7  Both, if Palestinians are to be believed.
While Barak repeatedly claimed to have “left no stone unturned” at Camp
David in his search for peace, the Palestinians came to the conclusion that,
on account of his “five no’s,”2 8  he had disregarded rather too many stones
unturned and began literally throwing them at Israel’s soldiers and settlers to
drive home their rejection of continued occupation.
TH E  MIL IT A R IZ A T IO N O F T H E  UP R I S IN G
Although the al-Aqsa intifada did not begin as a revolt against Oslo, a re-
fusal to return to the status quo ante is its driving force and the main factor
uniting all levels of Palestinian society and politics. Propelled by the bitter
harvest of the 1987–93 uprising, and deeply impressed by the stark contrast
between Israel’s systematic disdain for its Palestinian “peace partner” and its
comparatively scrupulous respect of unwritten understandings with its bitter
enemy Hizballah, those leading the current rebellion insist that, this time
around, the struggle will continue until Israel both agrees to a genuine peace
and actually implements it. For leaders such as Fatah West Bank secretary
general Marwan Barghouthi, the days are history when Israel exploited the
illusion of a peace process to camouflage its expansionist policies, simulta-
neously tying Palestinian hands with interminable negotiations over increas-
ingly insignificant redeployments while Dennis Ross jetted around the issues
proposing ever-more convoluted confidence-building measures.
In its opening phases, the current uprising seemed much like the last one:
mass demonstrations resulting in clashes between armed Israeli soldiers and
stone-throwing Palestinian youths; general strikes; the formation of a broad
coalition of Palestinian factions (the National and Islamic Forces, or NIF) to
give direction to the revolt;2 9 and rapid expansion from one region to the
next. Within days, there were also echoes of the 1996 tunnel intifada: ex-
changes of gunfire between Israeli and Palestinian gunmen; armed offen-
sives against Israeli outposts in Palestinian towns, including the tomb in
Nablus declared by settlers in the early 1970s to be Joseph’s; huge numbers
of casualties resulting from the massive deployment of Israeli force; and
frenzied American and Arab efforts to get the peace process back on track.
Very quickly, however, things began to deviate from these patterns. In-
stead of the armed intifada containing the popular one, they reinforced each
other, repeatedly being driven to new heights by each new Israeli outrage.
Instead of the leadership intervening to put an end to the unrest, it withdrew
the security forces from the battlefield and sent mixed messages to the street.
Instead of the clashes being limited to the boundaries between area A and
territory under Israeli control, they briefly spread across the Green Line as
Palestinian citizens of Israel took to the streets in demonstrations of national
solidarity. Perhaps most important, instead of the PA performing the func-
tions of the South Lebanese Army, Fatah began acting like Hizballah.
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Without a doubt, the active participation of Fatah as an organized force
acting with relative autonomy was the single most important factor in trans-
forming the early clashes into a sustained rebellion.
Instead of the PA The militarization of the uprising, tantamount to the
performing the functions of Lebanonization of the occupied territories, is another
the South Lebanese Army, primary characteristic of the al-Aqsa intifada that has
Fatah began acting emerged in the context of Fatah’s undisputed leader-
like Hizballah. ship of the struggle. At the same time, the uprising’s
failure to transcend the level of a prolonged outburst
of resistance to the occupation and develop into a sophisticated campaign to
end it—and, as an integral part of such a strategy, to nurture a civil rebellion
by a mobilized population—must also be ascribed primarily to Fatah.
The explanation for these factors is in significant part to be found in
Fatah’s complex relationship with the PA. Although Fatah members form the
backbone of the PA, the movement as such is not the party of government.
Rather, it has suffered an identity crisis since Oslo. One trend, generally iden-
tified with the senior echelons of the formerly exiled PLO bureaucracy, con-
siders Fatah’s mission all but accomplished and would like to see it gradually
transformed into a bureaucratized ruling party (like the Ba‘th party in Syria
or Iraq) whose main functions would be to legitimize the state, co-opt elites,
dispense patronage, and check the opposition.
The other trend, primarily associated with Fatah’s pre-Oslo organizational
infrastructure within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was generally more
skeptical with regard to the peace process and had a more developed vision
of the future Palestinian society. For both these reasons, and also because it
is less influential within the PA than its rival wing, this trend has sought to
maintain Fatah as an autonomous political movement that is neither
subordinate nor in opposition to the PA. Instead, its aim is to remain con-
nected enough with the popular base to be able to mobilize it behind na-
tional objectives and lead Palestinian society into a new era and sufficiently
involved with the PA to be able to obtain the resources to fulfil this
ambition.3 0
The problem for this more activist wing within Fatah was that the move-
ment’s close association with the PA in the popular mind caused it continu-
ally to lose ground (with polls showing ever increasing numbers checking
“none of the above” for party affiliation). Through the uprising, it has been
able to demonstrate its distinct identity vis-a`-vis the PA and recoup its losses
in spectacular fashion. Only Fatah, which has tentacles throughout the secur-
ity services and which the PA leadership will confront only under the most
extreme circumstances, was in a position to resume the armed struggle; had
Hamas or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) initiated
the uprising in a direct challenge to the PA, they would immediately have
been crushed by the security services. Similarly, only Fatah has the clout to
conduct operations such as the 17 January 2000 assassination of Hisham
Makki, the notoriously corrupt and universally reviled Arafat confidante and
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head of the Palestinian Broadcasting Company.3 1  Had it been Islamic Jihad,
the shots that killed Makki could well have unleashed a bloodbath. At the
same time, it is Fatah that ensures the formal loyalty of the NIF (which in-
cludes Hamas, the PFLP–General Command, and other opposition groups)
to the PA. It is also thanks to Fatah, primarily through the militarization of the
uprising, that (apart from itself) a genuine popular movement whose fury
might be directed inward has not emerged.
Just as it is absurdly simplistic to assert that Fatah—as the movement led
by Arafat and which supplies the security services with most of its cadres—
essentially provides the PA with plausible deniability to continue the upris-
ing, it is equally erroneous to view their relationship as heading for an inevi-
table confrontation. While there is a basic contradiction between the PA’s
approach to the al-Aqsa intifada as a tactic to bring Oslo to a successful con-
clusion and Fatah’s as a strategy to transcend it, these can coexist so long as
the uprising does not develop in ways that threaten the very existence of the
PA, and as long as the latter does not commit itself to terminating the upris-
ing prior to the end of the occupation.
On the ground, Fatah’s strategy has primarily been to turn the tables on
Israel’s infrastructure of control. Where Israel has established isolated settle-
ments within or on the outskirts of Palestinian towns in order to strangulate
them, these and the bypass roads that service them have been subject to
almost daily attack, underscoring both their vulnerability and the more gen-
eral point that the settlements and associated roads, far from contributing to
Israeli security, are in fact its Achilles’ heel. As a result, for the first time since
1967, more settlers are leaving than moving into the territories. If Israel re-
sponds with massive reinforcements, it only increases the number of poten-
tial targets. If it tightens the closure, it increases support for and participation
in acts of armed resistance. If it resorts to the aerial and naval bombardment
of Palestinian cities and the assassination of Palestinian militants by airborne
death squads, it exposes itself to heightened international censure and re-
gional isolation. And should it decide to eliminate the PA or substantially
weaken its security services, it need only remind itself what replaced the
PLO in Lebanon after Israel expelled it in 1982.
The problem for Israel is that its Field of Thorns strategy—an escalating
combination of overwhelming firepower, wholesale punitive and collective
sanctions, and special operations culminating in the outright military inva-
sion of PA territories—is specifically designed to secure the status quo.3 2 Yet
for both the PA and Fatah (to say nothing of the opposition forces) the status
quo is precisely the problem, and opposition to it is what unites them.
Indeed, the al-Aqsa intifada’s main political demands clearly reflect the
accumulated anger and frustration of the past seven years: Oslo’s terms of
reference must be replaced with the relevant UN resolutions; these must be
implemented, not negotiated; and the process must be guaranteed and
where necessary enforced by the international community. Specifically,
Israel must withdraw to the 1967 borders and dismantle its illegal Jewish
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settlements. It must choose between land and peace. To help Israel decide,
the uprising provides a daily reminder that it cannot have both.
It is clear that Israel is not going to concede these demands anytime soon.
In order to make the point, it has unleashed a level of violence unprece-
dented in the history of the occupation and imposed a siege that has para-
lyzed Palestinian life and stopped the economy dead in its tracks. It is the test
of wills all over again, but with a much higher price. This makes it all the
more difficult to predict where it will end.
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